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THE IMPACf OF PREVIOUS TRAINING IN SCHOOLS AND ON JOBS
ON
PRODUCfIVIIT, REQUIRED OJT, AND TURNOVER OF NEW HIRES
1. Introduction
Workers who are assigned to the same job and paid the same wage often differ
greatly in productivity. Coefficients of variation of individual productivity in specific jobs
based on hard measures of physical output average .144 for factory operatives, .35 for sales
clerks and .28 for craft workers (Hunter, Schmidt and ludiesch 1988). This paper examines
whether and to what extent variations in productivity (and other job outcomes) across
workers doing the same job at the same firm can be predicted by information on the
background and training of the individual worker.
Our primary goal in undertaking this analysis is to test for third party benefits to
employer provided training. When employers are asked why they do not do more training,
they often say that most firms find it is cheaper to poach trained workers from competitors
than to train their own skilled workers. Since trained workers are paid more than untrained
workers, these employers are saying that the wage premium is smaller than extra
productivity net of training cost of the trained worker. Put in economics jargon, what these
employers are claiming is that "training generates third party externalities." This claim will
be tested in this paper. Five specific questions are considered:
0 Does the time required to train a new employee tend to be lower if the
individual has already received relevant training at a school or in a previous
job? By how much? Which type of training has the bigger effect?
0 Is the reported productivity of a new employee higher if the individual has
previous relevant training? By how much? Which type of training has the
bigger effect?
a Are probabilities of a quit or discharge related to whether the new employee
has previous relevant training? Which type of training has the bigger effect?
0 Is the wage paid a new employee higher if the individual has previous relevant
training? Which type of previous training has the bigger effect?
0 Does the firm obtain greater profits if it successfully recruits workers who
have previous relevant training? In other words, is the productivity net of
2training, turnover, and wage costs consistently higher for new hires who have
previous relevant training? What type of previous training increases profits
the most?
The purpose is not to estimate the structural relationship between indicators of skill
and job performance so that we may predict the performance of prospective new hires. The
unknown character of the selection process by which job applicants are selected for and
retained in jobs makes unbi~ed estimates of structural relationships impossible.l We are
examining instead what kind of relationship between personal characteristics and
productivity survives the selection process which determines who gets hired and who is
retained in a job.
The issues raised by the first four questions are different from those raised by the
last. Employees with equal tenure in a job are not always paid the same wage, particularly
at small firms. In the EOPP-NCRVE employer survey--a sample dominated by small
establishments--the standard deviation of the log of the wage paid to incumbents in a
particular job was 0.146. Variation in the wage paid for particular jobs accounted for 4
percent of the total variation of starting wage rates in the sample and 5 percent of the
variation in the current wage rates of job incumbents. When firms offer different wage rates
to different hires, a perfectly competitive labor market is quite consistent with substantial
differences in the expected productivity, training requirements or turnover rates of new
employees hired for a specific job.
2. Hypotheses
2.1 Are Employer Expectations of New Hire Productivity Rational?
If assessments of differences in the expected productivity of job applicants grouped
by traits such as schooling and training are generally accurate, we would expect wage
differentials for visible worker traits to approximate productivity differentials. Thus, if
expectations regarding the productivity of new hires are rational and perfect competition
prevails in the labor market, the ex post profitability of a new hire should not be predictable
by information that is generally available to hiring decision makers. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is:
3Ho: When new hires for a particular job are compared, measures of the ex
post profitability of the new hire and of the discrepancy between expected and
realized productivitynthe surprise in productivity realizationsnshould not be
predictable by information on worker characteristics that is available to all
participants in the market at the time the hiring decision is made.
Labor markets are not perfect, however. Information about job applicants and about
alternative jobs is incomplete and costly to obtain. Even when good costless information
on skills is available to all participants in the labor market, the null hypothesis that new hire
profitability is unpredictable may be violated if:
1. The size of the match specific component of worker productivity and job
attractiveness varies a good deal across jobs and this variation is predictable. Match
specificity can result from skills which are useful at only one firm or only a few local
firms. This occurs when OJT or school-provided training develops industry- or
occupation-specific skills, and there are only a few firms in the locality that use these
skills. Employers who do use these skills will not have to pay wages that fully reflect
the high productivity of these workers at their firm. The attractiveness of a specific
job to a particular worker--which is indicated by the worker's reservation wage for
taking the job--is also match specific. for example, mothers who are able to work
only at certain times of the day or a short commute from their home will have lower
than average reservation wages for jobs which meet these criteria. A good fit with
coworkers and supervisors may also lower an individual's reservation wage. When
match specific rents are large, a whole range of wage rates may be consistent with
preservation of the job-worker match. From the firm's point of view a wide gap
between a worker's productivity and her reservation wage is a good thing, because
it means turnover will be low and the expected profitability of the match will be high.
Worker characteristics such as occupation specific training and being a married
women which are associated with a larger gap between productivity and the worker's
reservation wage should, therefore, have a positive relationship with the expected
profitability of a match.
42. The quality of the new hires a firm is able to attract varies cyclicly and seasonally.
When the economy is in recession, firms are able to hire workers with greater-than-
average amounts of previous.training and experience and higher-than-average levels
of expected productivity. At the peak of the cycle, when labor markets are tight,
employers are often forced to hire workers who have less training and experience and
who are less productive. The result is that some of the firm's employees (those hired
during a recession) are simultaneously more productive and better credentialed (i.e.,
have greater training and experience) than other employees. Thus, cyclical and
seasonal variations in the tightness of labor markets can produce a positive within-
firm correlation between credentials and the profit generated by particular employees
even if all new hires at any given point in time have identical expected productivity.
Information imperfections are a second major reason why the profitability of new
hires may be predictable.
3. Workers are not well informed about the wages they can command at another
firm. The costs of a job search--travel costs, lost earnings, and mental anguish--are
considerable. In unskilled and semiskilled labor markets, job seekers seldom have
the chance to accumulate job offers and choose between them when a thorough
search has been completed. Consequently, three-fourths of these job seekers accept
the first job offer they receive. The result is considerable random variation in the
expected productivity of new hires. Employers find that some of the time they are
able to recruit and hire a worker with exceptionally strong credentials and higher-
than-average expected productivity. On other occasions, the highly qualified
applicants can not be recruited and the firm must settle for someone with average
credentials and expected productivity. In this way, random variation in the expected
quality of the new hires produces a positive correlation between productivity and
credentials, even among people doing the same job who are paid the same wage.
4. Employers also lack good information on the occupational skills that job applicants
have developed on previous jobs. At the National Federation of Independent
Business firms surveyed for this paper, 60 percent of recent hires had been selected
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without a single contact being made with a supervisor on a previous job. Only 24
percent had been asked to demonstrate their skills prior to being hired. Only 7
percent of the new hires had shown their prospective employer a certificate of
training received on previous jobs. When clerical, service and blue collar jobs are
being filled, employers devote less than ten hours on average to recruiting and
selecting workers for each opening.
In many cases employers learn of the existence of previous training and its relevance
to their job after the employee has been working at the firm for awhile. Under these
circumstances, one might expect that new information on previous training to be a good
predictor of the relative productivity of workers even while information that was publicly
available during the hiring process is not predictive. One way to test specifically for this is
to measure and then predict the difference between productivity realizations and employer
expectations of that productivity held at the time the hiring decision was made. Such a test
will be conducted in this paper. These four considerations lead me to propose the following
hypotheses:
HI: When workers doing the same job are compared, the profitability of a
new hire--realized productivity, net of training, wage and turnover costs--
should be positively related to indicators of occupation and firm specific
skills such as previous relevant work experience and relevant school-based
occupational training.
H2: When workers doing the same job are compared, the profitability of a
new hire should be negatively related to indicators of high reservation wages
such as schooling, total work experience and being a married male and
positively related to indicators of low reservation wages such as being a
married women and Hispanic (because of its association with being an
undocumented worker).
H3: When workers doing the same job are compared, the surprise in the
productivity realizations of new hires--realized productivity minus expected
(at time of hiring) productivity--should be positively related to indicators of
the relevance of previous work experience and training that may not have
been available to hiring decision makers at the time hiring decisions were
made.
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2.2 The Empirical Model
The best method of testing for relationships between worker characteristics and the
job performance and profitability is to compare two individuals at the same firm in the same
job and see how differences in reported productivity, training costs, turnover and wages are
related to differences in background characteristics.
Let us assume that in a sample of people who have been recently hired for the fh job,
that job performance outcomes CYj) depend upon a vector of personal characteristics
describing the individual's background and general education (&), skills and training of the
individual relevant to this specific job CSjJ and characteristics of the job (Zj)' Real world
relationships are not, however, additive in the levels of these characteristics. Shop floor
practices and technology often constrain the degree to which individual differences in
learning ability or competence can generate individual differences in productivity or training.
If the workers of firm A are more adaptable and competent than firm B's workers, firm A
may be able to introduce profitable changes in technology and work assignments that firm
B is unable to introduce. Comparable differences in adaptability and competence between
occupants of a particular job might generate much smaller effects on individual productivity.
Alternatively, the opposite might prevail. Work might be structured such that
equipment breakdowns can be diagnosed and repaired by just a few highly skilled
operatives. Once a few highly skilled operatives are recruited or trained, there may be little
need to train others. Either way, the effect of individual characteristics on worker
productivity will differ depending on whether one is analyzing productivity differences within
firms and or productivity differences across firms. Processes by which individuals are
selected and retained in particular jobs may also cause II coefficients to be different from
A coefficients. A specification which takes this into account is:
(1) Yjj = Bilij-Xj) + lljCSij-.sj) + AXj + AjSj + OZj + uij + Vj
where
y.
-IJ is a vector of outcomes such as training time, supervisor reports
of a worker's productivity, or wage rate of employee "i" in job 'j",
X.
-I is a vector of background characteristics of individual "i" which describe
generic competencies (means of these characteristics for a job are Xj)'
7~ij
Z.
-J
is a vector of characteristics of individual "i" describing skills and training that
effect performance in job "j" (means of these characteristics for a job are ~j)'
is a vector of measurable characteristics of the job (j) including characteristics
of the employer,
U..IJ is a random error that is specific to the match between individual and the job.
V.J is an error that is specific to the job or employer respondent.
Two problems arise if we estimate equation (1). Data on the mean values of X and
S for a specific job are seldom available. When Xi's and Si/S are used to predict Y in
population samples, estimated coefficients end up being a mix of A's and B's. A second
problem is caused by the correlation between unmeasured characteristics of the individual
and characteristics of the occupation and job which influence wage rates and trainins
requirements. As a result, the covariance between Vjand ~j is almost certainly nonzero, so
biased estimates of Bj and Aj will result. Since our interest is in the B's, not the A's, both
of these problems can be finessed by estimating a model predicting the differences in the
outcomes experienced by two people in the same job at the same firm as a function of
differences in their background characteristics, as is shown in equation (2).
(2) Y trY 2j = !l(xcX~ + Bj(Slj-:S2j)+ (UlrU2j)
where person 1 and 2 both work in the same job 'T'.
Estimating this model produces unbiased estimates of!l and Bj if the Xi's and the ~i/S are
not correlated with the Ui/S.
2. Data on Training and Productivity Growth
The models described above will be estimated in two different data sets: the EOPP-
NCR VE Employer Survey and a survey of a stratified sample of ttIe membership of the
National Federation of Independent Business.
2.1 The EOPP-NCRVE Employer Survey
The EOPP-NCRVE Employer Survey conducted in the late Spring of 1982 provides
a unique data set for examining how the education, training and work experience of new
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hires effect the amount of on-the-job training they are given and the productivity they
achieve during the first year or so on the job. It provides retrospectively longitudinal data
on the time devoted to training and the reported productivity of two new hires at 659
different firms.
The sample of jobs for which paired data are available was generated in the following
manner. Telephone interviews were conducted with the owner/manager of 3,412 randomly
selected establishments. Of .these 2457 were single establishment firms and 930 were parts
of corporations with multiple establishments. Employers who received the full questionnaire
were asked to select "the last new employee your company hired prior to August 1981
regardless of whether that person is still employed by your company." A total of 818
employers could not provide information for a recent new hire. Most of these firms were
small organizations that had not hired anyone in recent memory. The employers that
provided information on one new hire were asked to provide data on a second new hire in
the same job but with contrasting amounts of vocational education. Of the 2,594 employers
that provided data on 1 new hire, 1,511 had not hired anyone else in that job in the last 2
years, and 424 had not hired anyone with a different amount of vocational training for that
position in the last 2 years. As a result, data are available for 659 pairs of individuals who
have the same job at the same establishment. Missing data on specific questions used in the
model further reduced the sample used for estimation to about 480.
Most of the establishments from which paired data are available are small. Seventy
percent have fewer than 50 employees, and only 12 percent have more than 200 employees.
Most of the respondents were the owner/manager of small firms who were quite familiar
with the performance of each of the firm's employees. At larger firms the personnel
director provided information about the firm and a line supervisor reported on the training
costs and the productivity of the individual worker(s) sampled for the study.
Information was obtained on how many hours each of the two new hires for this job
spent during the first three months of employment in three different kinds of training
activities: (1) formal training programs (T Fi)' (2) informal individualized training and extra
supervision by management and line supervisors (Ts), and (3) informal individualized
9training and extra supervision by co-workers (TcJ A copy of the relevant portions of the
questionnaire is available from the author.
A training time index was constructed by first making assumptions regarding the
relative value of trainer and trainee time and then combining the time invested in training
activities by these various individuals during the first three months on the job. Expressed
in coworker time units:
(3) Training Investment in the ith new hire = 1.8TFi + TCi + 1.5*Tsi + .8Twj + 4
At the firms which supplied data on training of a second employee, this index had an
arithmetic mean of 168 hours and a geometric mean of 93 hours.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger finns the immediate supervisor) to
report on productivity of both new hires during the first two weeks, during the next 11 weeks
and at the time of the interview (or just before leaving for those who leave the firm). The
rating was made on a "scale of zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity
rating any of your employees in (NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no
productivity by your employee." The fact that the non-response rate for this question was
only 4.4 percent (while it was 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 6.7 percent for
education, and 5.7 percent for the questions about starting wage rate) suggests that
respondents felt capable of making such judgments and augurs well for the quality of the
data that results. For the sample of firms which provided data on two new hires the mean
values of these indexes of reported productivity were 49.2 for the first two weeks, 64.7 for
the next 11 weeks and 75.4 at the time of the interview. A more thorough description of
the EOPP-NCRVE data is provided in Appendix A.
3.2 The National Federation of Independent Business Survey
A survey was conducted of a stratified random sample of the 500,000 members of the
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) during the first half of 1987. In order
to increase the representation of larger firms, NFIB members was stratified by employment
and large firms were over sampled. Salaried managers in charge of subunits of large
publicly owned corporations are not eligible for membership in NFIB, so the sample does
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not contain data on employment outcomes at large multi-establishment firms. A four page
questionnaire was mailed to approximately 11,000 firms, and after 3 follow up waves, 2599
response were obtained. Business owners with no employees in the previous year or who
had not hired anyone in the last 'three years, were asked to check a box and send the
questionnaire back completely blank. Five hundred and sixty nine of the returned
questionnaires were of this type. The questionnaire focussed on the owners experiences in
hiring and training workers in a particular job. This job was selected by asking the owner
the following question: "For which job have you hired the most people over the last two or
three years. (If you have more than one job for which you have done a lot of hiring, please
select the job requiring the greatest skill.) All future questions refer to this job." After a
series of general questions about the character of the job, the owner was asked to select two
individuals who had been hired for this job and answer all future questions specifically with
reference to those two, workers. The selection was made in response to the following
question:
Please think of the last person hired for this job (job X) by your firm prior to
August 1986 regardless of whether that person is still employed by your firm.
Call this individual person A The individual hired for job X immediately
before person A is called person B. Do not include rehires of former
employees.
The owner was then asked two and a half pages of questions about these two employees.
Information of varying degrees of completeness were obtained on 1624 person A's and 1403
person B's. Non response to particular questions reduced the sample further, so the number
of firms included in estimation was 1164 for starting wage rate and 1121 for initial
productivity.
Owners were asked both about starting wages and initial productivity at the beginning
of the second week of employment and about current wage rates and current productivity.
If one or both of the new hires had left the firm prior to the date of completing the
questionnaire, the owner was asked to provide information on the circumstances which
prevailed "at the time of separation." Nevertheless, a number of respondents failed to
provide data on outcomes "at time of separation," so the sample size for analysis of current
productivity was 833 and for current wage rates was 714.
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The constraints of a mail questionnaire forced a simplification of questions about
time devoted to training. Whereas the EOPP questionnaire distinguished formal from
informal, and informal training from supervisors from informal training by coworkers, all
three of these forms of training were combined in one very short question: "How many
hours did you or an .employee spend training or closely supervising A or B?" Two other
types of training investment were distinguished. The questions were: "How many additional
hours (beyond training and dose supervision) did A/B spend learning the job by watching
others rather than doing it?" and "How many hours did A/B spend reading manuals, etc. in
order to learn the job?" Owners were asked to complete this question for the "first week"
of employment and for the "next six months."z The training differential analyzed below is
the logarithm of the ratio of the total number of hours spent in the three forms of training
over the six month period.
3.3 The Productivity Indexes: Validity of the Ratio Scale Assumption
The questions asked in these two surveys about the productivity of particular
individuals do not yield measures of productivity that are comparable across firms or across
jobs within the firm. They are assumed, however, to be ratio scale measures of the relative
productivity of two particular workers who have the same job. Measurement errors are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the true ratio scale. Since the productivity indexes are
used as dependent variables not independent variables, measurement error only lowers the
significance of hypothesis tests, it does not result in biased coefficients. If these assumptions
are wrong and the variations in the productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate
the proportionate variations in true productivity, our estimates of percentage differences in
productivity between two workers will be biased upward. Even though it is possible for a
worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was defined as having a lower limit of
zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be negatively
correlated with the true value. Furthermore, respondents who were not well informed about
the relative productivity of their employees would probably tend to describe them as similar
in productivity and not to exaggerate the differences between them. If this is the case, then
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our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased
downward. This latter type of bias appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the ratio scale assumption results in an understatement of
percentage differences in productivity between individual workers doing the same job comes
from comparing the coefficients of variation of productivity in this and other data sets. If
pairs of workers who are still at the firm are used to construct a coefficient of variation in
the EOPP-NCRVE data set, it averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and blue collar
workers. This estimate of the coefficient of variation is smaller than the estimates of the
coefficient of variation for yearly output derived from analysis of objective ratio scale
measures of output. These estimates were .35 in sales clerk jobs, .144 in semi-skilled blue
collar jobs, .28 in craft jobs, .164 in routine clerical jobs and .278 in clerical jobs with
decision making responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means that the
estimates of the effect of background characteristics on relative productivity growth reported
in this paper are probably conservative. The fact that the employer is reporting on the past
productivity of particular employees may also generate biases in data, but it is not clear how
the estimated models might be influenced by this problem.
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4. Results
Our hypotheses relate to the partial relationship between measures of previous
training and experience and va~ious indicators of job performance while controlling
characteristics of the job that may vary within the pair and for other background
characteristics. Parallel analyses were conducted in the two data sets. Both data sets had
measures of the following skill and training indicators--previous relevant work experience
and its square, total work experience and its square, schooling, vocational education relevant
to the job, training received at a private vocational/technical institution that is relevant to
the job, and gender--which were entered simultaneously into the model. Characteristics of
the job-worker match that might influence the outcome were also included in the model.
When current or most recent reported productivity, current wage, and current profitability
are predicted, tenure, tenure squared and tenure during the first year were included as
controls. For models predicting starting wage rates and initial profitability, the date of the
hire and its square were controlled. In the models estimated in EOPP-NCRVE data,
controls were entered for hours worked per week, a dummy equal to one when the job was
supposed to be temporary, a dummy equal to one when the new hire was subsidized by a
CET A-OJT contract, a dummy equal to one when the employee was eligible for Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit subsidy and the employer knew this when the hire decision was made, and
a dummy equal to one when the employee was going to school part-time while working.
An almost identical specification was estimated in the NFIB data. The difference
was that the NFIB model contained no controls for receipt of subsidies for hiring particular
workers but does contain controls for race and Hispanic. Results for the EOPP and NFIB
data sets are presented next to each other in columns 1 and 2 respectively of Tables 1 to
6. Column 3 presents results of estimating a more complete model in NFIB data which
contains additional information on previous training received by the new hire. The
additional variables are: a dummy for having received relevant formal training at the work
site on a previous job, a dummy for having received relevant formal off site training
sponsored by a previous employer, a dummy for having received relevant training from the
military, a dummy for having received relevant training from Job Training Partnership Act
Table 1
Loe Trainim! Time
Previous Employer Trainine
Relevant Experience
Relevant Experience Squared
First Years Relevant Exp.
Formal Training On Job
Formal Training Off Job
Schooline
Years of Schooling
Relevant Vocational Training
Private Vocational Training
Relvant Training From Military
Relevant Training from JTPA
Years of Occupational Training
EOPP
-.064*** (5.22)
.0013*** (3.04)
-.082* (1.69)
NFIB
-.050*** (4.53)
.00140** (3.34)
-.125** (2.21)
.0084 (.69)
-.082** (2.30)
-.108* (1.33)
.005
.047
-.081
Total Experience
Total Experience Squared
Dcmoeraphic Backefotlnd
Female
Married Female
Married Male
Black
Hispanic
.0041
-.00013
(.69)
(.79)
.0064
-.00020
-.105* (1.71) -.083
Temporary Job
F Test On Model
-.239*** (3.32)
.026
.148
-.082
8.4***
R2
RMSE
Number of Observations
.209
.225
494
NFIB
-.045***(3.97)
.0012*** (3.02)
-.044 (.68)
-.168*** (2.81)
.070 (.64)
(.38)
(.76)
(1.01)
.006
.063
-.040
.218*
.105
-.025
.0041
-.00018
(.98)
(1.13)
(1.23)
(.43)
(.86)
(.50)
(2.21 )
(.59)
.
(1.05)
(.61)
(.95)
-.139*** (1.92)
.109* (1.99)
-.053 (1.08)
.038 (.39)
.145 (1.27)
-.081 (1.13)
(.27)
( 1.30)
(1.14)
6.2***
.075
.701
939
5.0***
.094
.696
939
.0100 (1.20)
.020 (.49)
.100** (2.21)
.
-.032 (.62)
.080 (.74)
.015 (1. 17)
- .0023 (.60)
.00004 (.38)
.002 (.04)
.024 (.79)
-.007 (.25)
.032 (.57)
-.058 (.94)
.008 (.21)
.021 * (1. 66)
8.8***
Table 2
Productivity At End Of First Week
Previous Employer Trainine
Relevant Experience
Relevant Experience Squared
First Years Relevant Exp.
Formal Training On Job
Formal Training Off Job
EOPP
.029*** (4.38)
-.00046** (2.01)
.020 (.76)
Schooline
Years of Schooling
Relevant Vocational Training
Private Vocational Training
Relevant Training From Military
Relevant Training From JTP A
Years of Occupational Training
.0096
.042 **
.125***
NFIB
.045*** (7.36)
-.00105*** (4.66)
.047 (1.49)
(I. 50)
(2.10)
(2.78)
.0120
.044
.101 **
Total Experience
Total Experience Squared
-.0097*** (2.98)
.00026*** (2.91)
-.0019
-.00004
Demoeraphic Backl:rollnd
Female
Married Female
Married Male
Black
Hispanic
.006
Temporary Job
Intercept
.078**
.005
F Test On Model
R2
RMSE
Number of Observations
.218
(.262)
494
* significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
*** significant at the I % level (two-sided)
(. 16) .013
(1.97)
(.37)
.031
-.062
.008
.023*
8.9***
.123
.422
1121
(1.49)
(1.29)
(2.30)
(.53)
(.42)
(.36)
(.57)
(1.01)
(.21)
(1. 79)
12.9***
NFIB
.042*** (6.80)
-.00097*** (4.25)
.004 (.11)
.095*** (2.83)
.003 (.06)
.132
.421
1121
Table 3
Startine Waee
Previous Employer Trainine
Relevant Experience
Relevant Experience Squared
First Years Relevant Exp.
Formal Training On Job
Formal Training Off Job
Schooline
Years of Schooling
Relevant Vocational Training
Private Vocational Training
Relevant Training From Military
Relevant Training From JTPA
Years of Occupational Training
EOPP
.016*** (3.69)
-.00037** (2.49)
.0010 (.06)
NFIB
.026*** (7.13)
-.00052*** (3.85)
.025 (1.42)
.014*** (3.49)
.031 ** (2.44)
.044 (1.55)
.019***
.033*
.068***
Total Exoerience
Total Experience Squared
.0079*** (3.76)
-.00014** (2.35)
.0116*** (5.72)
-.00052*** (3.85)
Demoeraphic Backeround
Female
Married Female
Married Male
Black
Hispanic
.024 (1.1) -.074***
-.008
-.110***
Temporary Job
Years Before Hired
Years Before Squared
.035 (1.36)
.039*** (6.06)
.0020*** (3.78)
-.028
.002
.0027*
F Test On Model 10.8***
R2
RMSE
Number of Observations
.296
.026
454
.263
.244
1164
* significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** significan! at the 5 % level (two-sided)
*** significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
NFIB
.023*** (6.40)
-.00046*** (3.42)
.015 (.74)
.019 (1.00)
.001 (.04)
(4.09)
(1.70)
(2.70)
.016*** (3.52)
.015 (.64)
.069*** (2.71)
-.004 (.13)
.0003 (.01)
.011 * (1.51)
.0094*** (4.43)
-.00020*** (3.63)
(3.43)
-.030
-.018*
.092***
-.015
-.119***
(.26)
(3. 19)
(1.30)
(.16)
(1.74)
-.027**
.006
.0023
29.2***
(1.33)
(1.04)
(5.97)
(.49)
(3. 51)
(1.30)
(.44)
( 1.48)
22.2***
.290
.240
1164
-.0042 (1.01)
-.000004 (.04)
.024 (.56)
-.048 (.79)
-.070 (.97)
.076* (1.79)
Table 4
Current Productivity
Previous Employer Training
Relevant Experience
Relevant Experience Squared
First Years Relevant Exp.
Formal Training On Job
Formal Training Off Job
Schooling
Years of Schooling
Relevant Vocational Training
Private Vocational Training
Relevant Training From Military
Relevant Training From JTPA
Years of Occupational Training
EOPP
.0157** (2.14)
-.Q(X)04 (.18)
.033 (1.08)
NFIB
.023*** (3.33)
-.00046* (1.85)
-.026 (.74)
(2.35)
(1.09)
(1.39)
.024***
.039
.082*
(2.60)
(1.01)
(1.69)
.017**
.024
.069
Total Experience
Total Experience Squared
Demographic Back2round
Female
Married Female
Married Male
Black
Hispanic
.0015
.Q(X)02
(.43)
(.21 )
.028 (.72)
Temporary Job .031 (.68)
Tenu re
Years of Tenure
Tenure Squared
Tenure First Year
-.108*** (2.62)
.0014*** (3.19)
.430*** (6.86)
+ .0885** (2.04)
-.0090** (2.04)
+ .328*** (4.98)
F Test On Model 8.7*** 8.7***
R2
RMSE
Number of Observations
.234
.305
534
.138
.412
833
* significarlt at the 10% level (two-sided)
** significant at the 5 % level (two-sided)
*** significant at the I % level (two-sided)
NFIB
.022*** (3.17)
-.00043* (1.74)
-.031 (.77)
-.003 (.08)
.159** (2.36)
.028***
.045
.103**
.098
.154
-.021
-.0046
.000004
.009
.020
-.027
-.047
-.069
.076*
.088**
-.0088**
.324***
(2.87)
(.97)
(2.06)
(1.62)
(1.39)
(1.38)
(1.06)
(.03)
(.20)
(.58)
(.86)
(.77)
(.96)
(1. 80)
(1. 80)
(2.0 1)
(4.92)
6.5***
.150
.411
833
NFIB
.025*** (4.86)
-.00047** (2.36)
.020 (.80)
-.013 (.52)
-.003 (.06)
.016*** (2.66)
.014 (.50)
.048 (1.42)
-.066* (1.66)
-.106 (1.52)
.019* (1.86)
.0103*** (3.71)
-.00026*** (3.44)
Table 5
Current Waee
Previous Employer Trainine
Relevant Experience
Relevant Experience Squared
First Years Relevant Exp.
Formal Training On Job
Formal Training Off Job
Schooline
Years of Schooling
Relevant Vocational Training
Private Vocational Training
Relevant Training From Military
Relevant Training From JTPA
Years of Occupational Training
EOPP
.0 I I** (2. 13)
-.00023 (1.33)
.031 (1.42)
NFIB
.026*** (5.22)
-.00050** (2.55)
.011 (.50)
.016*** (3.12)
.034** (2.17)
.064* (1.78)
.018*** (3.23)
.025 (1.05)
.068** (2.09)
Total Experience
Total Experience Squared
Demoeraphic Back2round
Female
Married Female
Married Male
Black
Hispanic
.0050* (1.95)
-.00008 (1.14)
.0099*** (3.72)
-.00026*** (3.51)
.008 (.26) -.113*** (4.45) -.088***
-.038*
.033*
-.010
-.131***
-.011 (.31)
-.136*** (3.08)
-.060** (2.17)Temporary Job -.082** (2.52) -.057**
Tenure
Years Of Tenure
Tenure Squared
Tenure First Year
( 1.50)
(.50)
(1.62) -.0054** (1.97)
-.0 14 (1.40)
.086***
-.0056**
.022
-.019
.045
.0002
.074
Intercept
F Test On Model 9.0*** 18.9***
R2
RMSE
Number of Observations
.240
.220
534
.290
.242
714
* significant at the 10% level (two.siJecl) ** significant at the 5% level (two-sided) *** signifncant at the I % level (two-sided)
(3.22)
(1. 72)
(1. 68)
(.28)
(2.99)
(2.02)
(3.99)
(2.07)
(.50)
(1. 83)
13.6***
.302
.240
714
Table 6
Profit In First Months
End of 6 End of 6
First Quarter Fi rst Week Month First Week Month
EOPP NFIB NFIB NFIB NFIB
Previous Employer Trainin2
Relevant Experience
.0239""'"'' (2.69) .025*** (2.88) .0124 (1.64) .025*** (2.84) .013* (1.65)
Relevant Experience Squared -.00030 (.97) -.0008** (2.39) -.0004 (1.51) -.0008** (2.41) -.0004 (1.50)
First Year Relevant Experience .044 (1.24) .076* (1.74) -.060 (1.58) .051 (1.01) -.053 (1.22)
Formal Training On Job .046 . (.98) -.011 (.27)
Formal Training Off Job .104 (1.20) .138* (1.84)
Schoolin!!
Years of Schooling -.015* ( !. 79)
-.032*"'* (2.81) -.013 (1.32) -.030** (2.52) -.012 (I. 16)
Relevant Vocational Training .047* (1.82) .025 (.54) -.016 (.40) .032 (.56) .008 (.16)
Private Vocational Training .055 (.93) -.004 (.05) -.005 (.09) -.009 (.14) -.0005 (.09)
Relevant Training From Military .026 (.34) -.006 (.10)
JTPA Vocational Training -.127 (.90) .128 (1.04)
Years of Occupational Schooling -.0088 (.46) -.815 (.90)
Total Experience
-.014*** (3.24) -.012*'" (2.29) -.021 *** (4.77) -.0093* (1.71) -.0196*** (4.17)Total Experience Squared .00035**'" (2.74) .00026* (1.80) .00046*** (3.96) .00022 (1.48) .0004*** (3. 15)
Demo2raphic Back2round
Female .044 (.98) .161 *** (3.12) .112** (2.50) .134** (2.38) .063 (1.30)Married Female -.023 (.55) .038 (1.05)
Married Male -.088** (2.29) -.087*** (2.64)
Black .021 (.27) -.062 (.93) .026 (.34) -.058 (.87)
Hispanic -.076 (.88) .020 (.26) -.054 (.63) .038 (.51)
Temporary Job .096* (1.84) .106* (I. 92) .077 (1 .60) .110 (2.00) .078 (1. 63)
Knew TJTC .028* ( \. 84)
CET A OJT Contract -.075 (.53)
SUBSIDIZED Hire .079 (.67)
Coop Student -.0016 (.03)
F Test On Model 4.0**'" 3.5*"'* 3.6**'" 2.75**'" 3.07*"''''
R2
.135 .058 .059 .068 .075
RMSE (.328) .506 .440 .505 .438
Number of Observations 454 819 819 819 819
*
significant at the 10% level (two-sided) ** significant at the 5 % level (two-sided) "'*'" significant at the I % level (two sided)
Table 7
Surprise at 6 Mo. Actual Productivity Current Wage
Actual- Expected At 6 Mo. Minus
Alternative Wage
Previous Employer Trainine
Relevant Experience .015** (2.53) .029*** (5.23) .0003 (.21)
Relevant Experience Squared -.0003 (1047)
-.0006*** (3. 11) -.00007 (1.25)
First Years Relevant Exp. -.004 (1.36) -.027 (.86) .0004 (.06)
Formal Training On Job -.046 (1048) -.009 (.30) -.005** (.61)
Formal Training Off Job .042 (.75) .066 (1.21) -.012 (.83)
Schooline
Years of Schooling .044 (.52) .013* (1.79) -.0037** (2.01 )
Relevant Vocational Training -.011 (.31) -.031 (.85) .005 (.55)
Private Vocational Training .080* (1.90) .123*** (2.98) -.010 (1.01)
Relevant Training From Military .096* (1.92) .106** (2.15) -.013 (1. 10)
Relevant Training From JTP A .089 (.99) .157* (1.70) -.031
.(1045)
Years of Occupational Training .003 (.23) .005 (AS) -.004 (1.29)
Total Experience -.0076** (2. 14) -.0079** (2.30) .0012 (1040)
Total Experience Squared .0001 (1.03) .00009 (.99) -.00002 (.89)
Demo~raphic Back~rolmd
Female -.005 (.13) .007 (.20) .006 (.70)
Married Female .039 (1. 39) +.024 (.90) -.0004 (.06)
Married Male .002 (.08) -.005 (.22) .013** (2.19)
Black -.028 (.56) -.065 (1.32) -.0067 (.57)
Hispanic .002 (.04) -.049 (.90) .005 (AI)
Temporary Job .004 (. 11) .008 -.0128 (1.56)
F Test On Model 1.38 3.79*** .53
R2
.028 .068 .038
RMSE (.35) (.36) (.08)
Number of Observations 937 872 872
* significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** significant at the 5 % level (two-sided)
*** significant at the I % level (two-sided)
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program, total number of years of school based vocational training and separate dummies
for being a married female or a married male.
Despite differences in sampling, selection processes and in variable definitions, the
two data sets generate remarkably similar findings. The data analysis strategy being
employed in this paper has not been tried before so it is quite heartening that the results
turn out to be remarkably robust. For example, in both data sets initial productivity and
required training are significantly influenced by relevant vocational education and years of
previous relevant work experience but not by years of schooling or total work experience.
Consequently, the discussion of the results will be organized not around data set, not even
around dependent variable but around categories of right hand side variables.
* Work Experience--contrasts between relevant experience and total experience.
* The firm specificity of skills--as indicated by contrasts between the effect of tenure
and previous relevant work experience on current productivity.
* Schooling and relevant occupational training obtained at schools.
* Demographic characteristics--gender interacted with marital status and minority
status.
4.1 Relevant Versus Irrelevant Prior Work Experience
The effects of both relevant and irrelevant work expenence on training costs,
productivity, turnover, wage rates and profitability are summarized for the EOPP data in
Table 8. Results from analysis of NFIB data are presented in Table 9.
Relevant Work Experience: According to their employers, the new hires in the
EOPP data had an average of 2.3 years of relevant work experience and the new hires in
the NFIB data had an average of 5.3 years of relevant work experience when hired.
Relevant work experience significantly increased the productivity of new hires and
significantly reduced the time required to train them (see columns one and two of the
table). Substituting five years of relevant experience while holding total experience constant
raised productivity by 25 percent in the first 2 weeks, by 15 percent over the course of the
next 10 weeks, and by 8 or 9 percent at the time of the interview. It also reduced training
costs by one-third and raised productivity net of training costs by 44 percent. Because
TABLE 8
EFFECTS OF WORK EXPERIENCE
(In percent)
Relevant Experience Total
Ol1trf\m(>~ 1 Vp~r
Experience
; VP~N;
~V{'~rs R 'I)II~ rp
Productivity Net of Trainine Cost
First 3 Months + 10*** + 44 *** - 3.2* .206
Productivity
..
First. 2 Weeks + 5*** +25*** - 6.0*** .209
Next 12 Weeks + 3.4*** + 15*** - 3.4** .159
Most recent for full sample + 1.8*** + 8.2*** - .9 .163
Current for stayers 2.0*** + 8.9*** 0 .182
Required Trainin~
Formal training
- 8* -35* .7 .075
Informal by management
- 8*** -36*** + 3.4 .082
Informal by co-workers
- 8*** -37*** - 8.0 .056
Total training
- 7*** -33*** - 1.7 .213
Wa2es
Starting 1.4*** 6.4*** 3.6*** .292
Most recent for full sample 1.3*** 5.6*** 2.3* .230
Current for stayers 1.8*** 9.8*** 2.1 * .200
Profitability of Hire Durine
First 3 Months 7*** 30*** -12*** .127
Productivity Minus \Vaee
Most recent for full sample .8 3.9 - 3.0* .054
Current for stayers .7 3.3 - 2.7* .078
Turnover
Tenure 2 8 - .6 .646
Quit 3 15 - 3.0 .054
Discharge or layoff -15 -65** 10.0 .042
Note: Fixed effects regressions run on 455-524 pairs of new hires in the 1982 NatlonaJ Employer Survey. All
models contained control variables for whether the worker was currently a vocational educatIOn student, yc::ars
of schooling, vocationa1 education interacted with years of schooling, private vocational education. sex, whether
hired in a temporary job, whether the hire was knOl,l,l1to be eligible for a subsidy when hired, and current
average hours per we.::k. Models for current or most recent wage, productivity, and profitability have
additional controls for actual tenure and tenure squared. The turnover regressions arc based on 510 pair" of
new hires for nontemporary jobs and control the log of potential tenure and its square.
*
significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
**
signi ficant at the 5 % level (two-sided)
***
Significant at the I % level (two-sided)
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workers with 5 years of relevant experience are so much more productive, their probability
of discharge or layoff falls by 65 percent, from 12 percent to about 4 percent. Thus despite
their slightly higher quit rate, they have slightly greater expected tenure than new hires who
lack relevant experience.
In NFIB data ten years of relevant experience while holding total experience constant
increased productivity by 32.7 percent in the first week, by 20.3 percent at the end of six
months and by 13.3 percent at the time of the interview. Workers with an extra ten years
of relevant experience required 30.7 less training time during the first six months and were
significantly more likely to make suggestions which improved sales or productivity.
Irrelevant Work Experience: Total work experience was defined as the total number
of years since completing school or reaching the legal working age, whichever is smaller.
The mean of this variable was 8.2 years in EOPP data and 10.2 years in NFIB data.
Experience that was not relevant to the job had dramatically different effects on productivity
and training costs. In EOPP data five years of experience considered irrelevant by the
employer was associated during the first 3 months on the job with new hires being 3-6
percent less productive. Productivity net of training costs was also about 3 percent lower.
Irrelevant experience did not have significant effects on time devoted to training or turnover.
The analysis of NFIB data yields similar results. Ten years of irrelevant experience had no
significant impact on initial productivity, training requirements, and total turnover but it
reduced productivity at 6 months of tenure by a statistically significant 6.9 percent.
There are probably two reasons why irrelevant experience often has a negative
association with productivity in this data. Older workers who lack occupationally relevant
experience may have a type of experience that produces habits and skills that must be
unlearned when the individual enters a very different setting. This is certainly the view
taken in Japan. A second possible reason is the obsolescence and forgetting of skills and
knowledge gained in school that might be relevant to the job (Kohn and Schooler 1983).
When relevant experience is held constant, total experience measures the time period over
which potentially relevant skills that were gained in school have been depreciating through
lack of use. Apparently these two effects outweigh beneficial effects from general OJT that
is not relevant to the job at the new firm.
Table 9
Work Experience Relationships in NFIB Data
(in percent)
10 Years 10 Years Relevant Formal Training
Relevant Total Exp Replaces On Job OffJoo
Experience Experience lrrel Exp
Productivity
End of First Week 30.0% -2.7 32.7*** 9.5*** .3
End of 6 Months 13.4%
-6.9* 20.3*** -.9 6.6
Current 9.8% -3.5 13.3*** .3 15.9**
Ideas 43.5% -1.7 45.2*** 13.6 373**
Required Training -29% 2.4 -30.7** * -17.3*** 7.2
Wage Rates
Starting 31.4% 7.6*** 22.1 *** 1.9 .1
Current or Most Recent 34.5% 8.0*** 24.6*** -1.3 -.2
Expected Productivity 9.7% -.5 10.2*** 4.2*** 2.5
Surprise .6% -6.6** 7.2** -4.6 4.2
Profitability
End of First Week 22.6% -10.3* 32.8 *** 6.7 15.2
End of 6 Months 12.3% -15.5*** 3.2* -1.1 13.8*
Current or Most Recent -13.0% -6.5 -6.6 2.0 18.6*
Turnover
Leave -15.6% -4.5 -11.1 -8.4 -31.0
Quit -49.4% -22.2 -27.2 -8.9 -.4
Discharge or Layoff +31.6% +20.0 + 11.6 -5.9 -68.8
Column 1 is the estimated effect of increasing both relevant and total experience by ten
years. No test of significance was calculated for this variable. Column 2 presents the effect
of increasing total experience by ten years while holding relevant experience constant.
Column 3 presents the estimated effect of ten years of relevant experience while holding
total experience constant. Percentage effects for required training and wage rates are anti
logs of ten years effects calculated from logarithmic models for training and wage rates.
The suggestions index ranges from 0 to 3 and has a mean of 1.027.
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The contrast between relevant experience's large positive impact on productivity and
irrelevant experience's negative impact has some important implications. When one looks
across new hires for a specific job, it is the occupation- or industry-specific skills that have
the greatest impact on productivity. Thus the key to making work experience payoff is
gaining experience and training that are relevant to the career one plans to pursue and
entering that career path immediately after leaving school. Changes in a career that do not
make use of the occupation- or industry-specific skills that have been accumulated
necessarily involve large sacrifices of productivity and income. The longer a particular
career path has been pursued, the greater the sacrifice will be.
Even though it is associated with lower productivity, irrelevant experience is also
associated with higher wage rates relative to coworkers. The effect of irrelevant experience
on the wage is about one-third of the size of the effect of relevant experience on wage
rates? In NFIB data, the first ten years of irrelevant experience lowers profitability by 10.3
percent of the wage in the first week and by 15.5 percent of the wage after 6 months on the
job. In EOPP data, five years of irrelevant experience lowered profitability by 12 percent
of the wage in the first 3 months and by 3 percent of the wage at the time of the intervkw.
Older workers who lacked relevant work experience were less profitable new hires partly
because (a) their higher reservation wages (better alternatives at other firms) forced
employers to pay them extra and (b) because employers tended to expect older workers to
be more productive than they turned out to be.
Productivity Surprises: Evidence on this last issue can be found in Table 7 which
presents a regression model predicting the discrepancy between realized productivity at the
end of six months and the respondents expectation of that productivity at the time the
individual was hired. Our hypothesis that expectations were generally rational is supported
by the prevalence of insignificant coefficients and the insignificance of the F Test for the
model as a whole. But there are exceptions. Employers were pleasantly surprised by the
productivity of workers with relevant work experience and unpleasantly surprised by the
productivity of those with irrelevant work experience. These findings support our hypothesis
H3. Profitability can be predicted by relevant work experience because many employers
were not aware of the relevance of the new hire's previous work experience until long after
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the hiring decision. Since total work experience is easy to measure prior to hiring, the
combined effect of the two variables should have been well foreseen by employers, but since
the two variables are strongly corre,lated, a positive coefficient for relevant experience in the
model predicting the productivity surprise tends to cause the coefficient on total work
experie!lce to become negative.
4.2 Spillovers from Employer Training
We will now compare the impact of previous relevant training on wage rates to its
impact on productivity. Holding total experience constant in EOPP data, starting wage rates
were 6.4 percent higher for those with 5 years of relevant experience. The additional pay
seems to be considerably smaller than the benefit--a 44 percent increase in productivity net
of training costs during the first 3 months-- that the firm derives from hiring a worker with
5 years of relevant experience. This hypothesis was tested by defining for each new hire a
measure of relative profitability--productivity net of the wage and training costs--during the
first 3 months and then analyzing how worker characteristics influence profitability of the
new hire. The definition of the profitability variable is described in Appendix B. Hiring
workers with 5 years of relevant experience reduces losses or increases profits during the
first 3 months by an amount equal to 30 percent of the typical new hire's productivity net
of training costs (see line 13 of Table 8).
Holding total experience constant in NFIB data, ten years of relevant work
experience increased starting wage rates by 22 percent and current wage rates by 24.6
percent. It also increased profitability by 32.8 percent of the wage in the first week and by
3.2 percent of the wage at the end of six months. Both of these effects are significant at the
5 percent level on a one tail test or better. Clearly the firm benefits when it is able to hire
workers trained by other firms.
How long does this spillover benefit last? Five years of such experience is apparently
associated with an increase in the profit margin at the time of the interview that is equal in
magnitude to somewhere between 3.3 and 3.9 percent of the worker's potential productivity
in EOPP data and lowers it by an equivalent amount in NFIB data.4 Neither of these
effects is statistically significant, however. The spillover benefit of hiring relevantly trained
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workers diminishes with tenure apparently approaching zero after a year or so. In addition
turnover is lower for workers who had relevant work experience though here again the
finding is not statistically significant. These results suggest that firms hiring workers with
relevant experience retain for themSelves much of the greater productivity and lower
training costs of these workers during the first few months on the job. Since members of
the sample had fewer than two years of tenure at the time of the interview it is not possible
to say what happens to the relative profitability of experienced and inexperienced hires in
the third and subsequent year at the firm.
The NFIB survey also has data on formal training received on and off the job.
Formal training received on-the-job from a previous employer has no effect on the starting
wage but increases initial productivity by 9.5 percent of the wage and reduces training
requirements by 17.3 percent. It has no effect, however, at the time of the interview.
Formal tra~ning received off the job, on the other hand, has no initial effect on anything but
it increases the index of suggestions by 37 percent and current productivity by 15.9 percent.
Formal training does not increase current wage rates, however, so profitability increased by
13.8 percent of the wage at six months of tenure and by 18.6 percent of the wage at the time
of the interview.
These results suggest that on-the-job training sponsored by firm A not only benefits
the employee and employer (as implied by Becker's theory of OJT), but also sometimes
benefits other employers in the industry who hire workers who quit or are laid off by firm
A. In other words, OJT often creates externalities--benefits that are not appropriated by
either the trainer or the trainee. Formal off-the-job training generates substantial long
lasting externalities and the informal training captured by the relevant experience variable
appears to generate externalities only in the first year or so of a worker's tenure at a firm.
The market failure that is implied by this finding is justification for some modest
governmental efforts to stimulate the externality creating activity--general on-the-job training
in general and off-the-job employer sponsored training in particular. The lack of long term
data on the magnitude of spillovers is a problem, however, for it is always possible that the
\
profits generated in the first year or two by hiring an experienced/trained worker are offset
by losses in the out years. Clearly, more research on the issue is needed.
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4.3 Effects of Vocational Education
The proportion of new hires who are reported to have received relevant
occupationally specific training from a school is quite high: about 20 percent in EOPP data
and 37 percent in NFIB data. The effect of this school based training on performance
outcomes in EOPP data is summarized in Table 10 and in Table 11 for NFIB data.
Effect of Vocational Training from Public Institutions--EOPP Data: New hires who
received relevant vocational education required smaller amounts of on-the-job training and
were more productive in the first few months on the job. Analysis of the EOPP data set
(not reported here) found that employees who have had vocational training that is not
relevant to the job were slightly less productive in the first 2 weeks and require slightly more
training then people who have had no vocational training.
The impact of relevant vocational education varied considerably by level and
provider. Consequently, the EOPP analysis offers separate estimates of the effects of
training received at private and public institutions and of the effects of training received by
workers with different levels of schooling (a high school diploma or less, some college, and
a 4-year college degree or more). The impacts of relevant vocational education received
at a public institution are reported for each of the three categories of educational
attainment in columns 1 to 3 of Table 10. The additional impact of receiving one's training
at a private institution is reported in column four. The impact of an additional 4 years of
schooling is reported in column 5.
EOPP data suggests that the effects of relevant vocational training were largest for
those with 1-3 years of college. It increased productivity in the first 2 weeks by 13 percent,
reduced management training time by 35 percent, and reduced overall training time by 22
percent. Vocational training at these institutions appear to have increased tenure slightly
though not significantly so. Overall productivity net of training costs during the first 3
months increased by a significant 22 percent. Starting wage rates were a significant 8
percent higher. The fact that productivity net of training cost increased more than wage
rates implies that for those with 1-3 years of postsecondary education, vocational training
benefits the employer as well as the new hire. The magnitude of the spillover benefit during
Vocational Vocational
Education Vocational Education Extra Impact Impact of
with 12 or Education with 4+ of Private 4 Years of
Fewer Years with Some Years of Vocational General
of School College College Education Education
+7 +22** 0 +22* 1
3* 13** 3 20*** 0
2 4 4 7 2
3 1 -10 7 5*
-9 +25 +73 -37 -10
-8* -35*** -19 - 9 8
+4 -26 - 2 -36* +24**
-9
-22** +12** -20** 3
10*** 8*** 2 4 0
-17 16 -5
- 4 2 0
11 7
- 4
29 - 7 -21
-54 -34 33
TAhLE 10
EFFECTS OF RELEVANT VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
(in percent)
Outcomes
Productivity New of Trainin~
Cost First 3 Months
Product ivit V
First 2 Weeks
Next 12 Weeks
At time of Interview
Required Trainine
Formal training
Informal by management
Informal by co-workers
Total training
Waees
Starting
At time of interview
Profitahilitv of Hire Durine
Fir"st 3 Months 166
Productivity Minus Wa~e
(at time of Interview)
Tunwver
Tenure
Quit
Discharge or layoff
-6
-18
+23
10
10
-24
Note: Fixed effects regressions run on 435 pairs of new hires in the 1982 National Employer Survey for all models included control variables for whether
the worker IS currently a vocational education student, was hired in a temporary job, was known to be eligihle for a suhsidy when hired, and current
aver<1!'e hours per week. Models for cllrrent or most recent wage, productivity, and profitahility have additional controls for actual tenure and tenure
squared. Models for starting wage and profitahility in the first 3 months control for date of hire and date of log of potential tenure and its square. In the
firsl and thin! columns of the tahle the +'s report on a hypothesis test of differences hetween the effect of high school (4-year college) vocational education
and the effect of vocational education received at a community college or technical institute.
+ significant at the 109\ level (two'slded)
+* significant al Ihe 50/, levc\ (two-slll,'d)
++* slgnlficanl al the I'r. level (two,slded)
Table 11
School Based Occupational Training Relationships in NFIB Data
(in percent)
Relevant Private Relevant Relevant Years of
Vocational Vocational Military JTPA Voc/Tech
~Outcomes Training Training Training Training Training
Productivity
End of First Week 2.0 10.0** -3.2 8.0 1.5 1.0
End of 6 Months -3.1 12.3*** 10.6** 15.7* .5 1.3*
Current 4.5 10.3** 9.8 15.4 -2.1 2.8 ***
Ideas 2.7% 2.3 10.1 -6.0 4.7 7.8* **
Required Training 6.5 -4.0 24.4** 11.1 -2.5 .6
Wage Rates
Starting 1.5 7.1*** -0.4 0.0 1.1 1.6***
Current or Most Recent 1.4 4.8
-6.6* -10.6 1.9* 1.6***
Expected Productivity -1.4 4.4** 3.9 7.7* 0.5 0.7*
Surprise -1.1% 8.0* 9.6* 8.9 0.3 0.4
Profitability
End of First Week 3.2 -0.9 2.6 -12.7 -0.9 -3.0* *
End of 6 Months 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 12.8 -1.5 -1.2
Current or Most Recent 5.3 -7.6 11.8 1.7
-3.8* 1.4
Turnover
Leave -11.8% -11.9 5.8 -40.5 -1.5 -0.8
Quit -30.6% 17.2 20.0 -8.1 -1.2 7.1
Discharge or Layoff 17.5% -54.0* -4.3 -90.4 -2.2 -9.4
Column 1 is the estimated effect of relevant vocational training obtained at a public institution.
Column 2 presents the additional effect of obtaining training at a private voc/tech institution.
Column 3 presents the additional effect of receiving relevant training from the military. Column
4 presents the additional effect training obtained through the Job Training Partnership Act.
Column 5 presents the effect of the length (in years) of vocational training. Percentage effects for
required training and wage rates are anti logs of ten years effects calculated from logarithmic
models for training and wage rates. The suggestions index ranges from 0 to 3 and has a mean of
1.027.
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the first 3 months is estimated to be 16 percent of productivity net of training costs in EOPP
data. This estimate is not significantly different from zero, however, and the point estimate
is very close to zero by the time of the interview.
Vocational education obtained in high school apparently has smaller effects on
productivity, training requirements, and wage rates than vocational education obtained at
2-year postsecondary institutions. The difference is statistically significant for initial
productivity, for informal training by management, and for starting wage rates. College
graduates with vocational training get significantly more training than other vocational
trained workers in the same job, but, in other respects, are not significantly different from
those with some college. Their overall productivity net of training costs during the first 3
months is no higher than that of workers with no vocational training.
By the date of the interview, however, the productivity advantage of workers with
vocational training from a public institution over others in the same job has greatly
diminished.
Effect of Training at Public Institutions--NFIB data: Vocational training at public
institutions has no statistically significant effects on performance outcomes in the NFIB data.
Training at Private Voc/Tech Institutions: High productivity and significant
reduction in training costs result from hiring employees who have been trained at privately
controlled vocational-technical schools or colleges. Compared to students who received
their vocational training at public institutions, privately trained students are 20 percent more
productive initially in EOPP data and 7 percent more productive at the time of the interview
and require 20 percent less training. Their overall productivity net of training costs during
the first three months is 22 percent higher. In EOPP data their starting wage rates are only
4 percent higher, so the firm benefits significantly when it is able to hire a graduate of
private vocational-technical institution.
In NFIB data hiring a graduate of a private voc/tech institution has a smaller effect
on training requirements but a larger effect on initial and current productivity and wage
rates. The wage increase roughly corresponds to the productivity benefit so profitability is
not significantly effected by hiring a graduate of a private voc/tech school.
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Military Training: About 3.8 percent of the new hire~ had received relevant training
in the military. These workers typically must receive extra training from their new employer
but at six months they are 10.6 l?ercent more productive than workers who have been
trained at a public voc/tech institution and at the time of the interview they are 9.8 percent
(P = .105) more productive. Since they typically received below average pay at the time of
the interview, they are probably very profitable hires in the long run. Employers appear to
be surprised by the performance of those with training from the military.
JTP A: Only 2 percent of the new hires in the sample had received training funded
by the Job Training Partnership Act. This was too small a number to produce findings
which are statistically significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, point estimates tell
a fascinating and very positive story. In a previous paper (Bishop 1989) analyzing EOPP
data, I found evidence that disadvantaged individuals who participate in TITC and CET A
were stigmatized by the signal of their disadvantaged status generated by their participation
in the program and consequently performed better than they were expected to. Analysis of
data on JTP A trainees yields similar results. JTP A graduates started out 8 percent more
productive (P =.47 on a two tail test) than other vocationally trained workers,
received/required 10 percent more training (p=.56) but they were 15.7 percent more
productive (P = .089) at six months and 15.3percent more productive (P = .165) at the time
of the interview and are 12 percentage points (P =.224) less likely to be fired. Despite the
positive impacts on productivity, current wage rates were 10 percent below (P = .129) the
other occupant of the job. As in the earlier study, these findings suggest that standard
evaluations which focus on the wage and earnings outcomes of programs like JTP A and
CET A are biased by the stigma generated by signalling the trainee's disadvantaged status
and thus substantially understate the social benefits of such training.
Years of Schooling: In EOPP data additional years of schooling generally did not
have statistically significant effects on initial productivity, required training, and turnover but
was related to receiving more informal OJT from co-workers. Schooling is, however,
positively related to productivity at the time of the interview in both data sets and to
expected productivity in NFIB data. These results contradict the claims ofIvar Berg (1971)
in the Education and Jobs: Great Training Robbery (1971). The fact that years of
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schooling has zero impact on initial productivity bUt a sif,nificant impact on productivity
after a year suggests that schooling helps the individual learn the job.
Schooling is also positively related to both starting and current wage rates. Since
starting wages respond positively to schooling even though initial productivity does not, years
of schooling is negatively related to profitability in the first quarter in EOPP data and
profitability in the first week in NFIB data. With time, however, this effect disappears.
Schooling has no effect on profitability at the end of 6 months or at the time of the
interview.
4.5 Demographic Characteristics
The productivity, training requirements and turnover of Black and Hispanic
employees are not significantly different from other employees. Black employees also
receive the same wage rates. Hispanic employees are, however, paid significantly less--12
to 13 percent less--than others at the same firm. Why? The profitability models provide
a clue for in these estimations Hispanics are not significantly more profitable for the firm.
Hispanics did require some additional training and were about 5 percent less productive
than other workers but the differences were not statistically significant. When a profitability
variable is constructed, these factors offset the lower wage and the result is that the reduced
wage appears to be justified by productivity differences. The alternative explanation of this
phenomenon is the one labeled H2 in section 2. It was suggested that the undocumented
workers of Hispanic background have almost no bargaining power when they negotiate with
employers about wages and thus are paid less. This hypothesis receives no support in this
data set.
Gender and marital status has no significant impact on productivity or tenure. In the
NFIB data single women require/receive 13.9 percent less training than single men, but
married women require/receive 16 percent more training than married men. The big
gender differences are in wage rates. Wage rates for single and married women are
significantly below the wages received by married men. Relative to married men, single
women are paid 12 percent less both at the start and at the time of the interview and
married women are paid 14 to 16 percent less. Single men fall in the middle. This appears
to be a result of differences in bargaining power and reservation wages. There are no
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significant effects of gender and marital status on the surprise component of productivity
realizations and point estimates of the gender related surprises are small. Consequently, we
can rule out the hypothesis that the lower wages were caused by employers having expected
women to do a poorer job (see Table 7). The profitability findings are similar to the wage
findings and the diff~rences between married men and women are highly significant. In the
NFIB data, single and married women generate substantially higher profits for their
employer than married men. The additional profit from hiring a single women rather than
a married man is 22 percent of the wage in the first week and 15-16 percent of the wage
after 6 months and at the time of the interview. The additional profit from hiring a married
women rather than a married man is 19 percent of the wage in the first week and at six
months and 23 percent at the time of the interview.
In summary, the analysis finds no support for a bargaining power (more commonly
called a discrimination) explanation of lower wages for blacks and Hispanics. Blacks do not
receive lower wages than others in the job and the lower wages received by Hispanics
appear to be due to lower productivity and higher training costs. The analysis offers
support, however, for the bargaining power hypothesis as an explanation of differences
between married men and both single and married women.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper examined the relationship between the prior training of new hires and the
productivity, training costs, wages and turnover of the new employees hired for the same job.
Nonrandom selection for and retention in these jobs make unbiased structural estimates of
underlying population relationships between background characteristics and productivity
infeasible. Analysis of the reduced form relationships, however, reveal a significant tendency
of new hires with relevant previous work experience, relevant employer sponsored formal
training and relevant vocational education (particularly when obtained from a private
voc/tech institution) to require less training, to be more productive, to be paid higher wages
both initially and after one year.
The paper also provides a unique test of the rationality of the expectations which are
the basis of wage offers to new hires and of the competitiveness of these labor markets.
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The rationality of expectations about the future productivity of new hires was tested by
measuring and then predicting the surprise in productivity realizations--the difference
between relative productivity at six months and employer expectations of that productivity
held at the time the hiring decision was made. Worker characteristics known to of which
hiring decision makers at the time of hiring had no significant relationship with the surprise
in productivity realizations. The R2 of the model was only 2.8 percent. On the other hand,
worker characteristics which are frequently not known to hiring decision makers at the time
hiring--the relevance of previous work experience--were significantly related to the surprise
in productivity realizations.
The paper also examined the efficiency and competitiveness of the market for new
hires. If expectations are rational and the market competitive, we would expect (a) wage
differentials for visible worker traits to approximate productivity differentials and (b) ex post
profitability of new hires would not be predictable by information that is generally available
to hiring decision makers. This hypothesis must be rejected, however, because a number
of significant predictors of the ex-post profitability of new hires were uncovered. Prior
relevant work experience and formal off-job training were postively associated with the
profitability of the hire and total potential work experience and being a married male were
negatively related to profitability. These results suggest that many employers are not aware
of the exact character of the training and experience their new hires bring to the firm and,
consequently, that new hires who have training and experience from previous jobs often do
not receive commensurately higher wage rates. This suggests that training sometimes
generates third party externalities when trainees do not stay with the employer who provides
them with training. If this conclusion is correct, modest governmental efforts to stimulate
general on-the-job training and employer sponsored formal off-the-job training would appear
to be in order.
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Appendix A
THE EOPP EMPLOYER SURVEY
AND
THE MEASUREMENT OF TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWfH
The analysis is based on data from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the
National Institute on Education (NIE) and the National Center for Research in Vocational
Education (NCRVE) conducted between February and June 1982. The survey was the
second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers from selected geographic areas
across the country. The first wave was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor to collect
data on area labor market effects of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP).
The survey encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18 comparison sites selected for their
similarity to the pilot sites. The ES-202 lists of companies paying unemployment insurance
taxes provided the sample frame for the survey. Because of the interest in low wage labor
markets, the sample design specified that establishments in industries with a relatively high
proportion of low-wage workers be over sampled. The tax paying units were stratified by
the estimated number of low wage employees and the number of establishments selected
from each strata was roughly in proportion to the estimated number of low wage workers
at the establishments in that strata. Within strata the selection was random. The survey was
conducted over the phone and obtained a response rate of 75 percent.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the first-wave
survey. About 70 percent of the original respondents completed surveys for the second
wave. Most of the respondents were the owner/manager of small firrns who were quite
familiar with the performance of each of the firm's employees. Seventy percent of the
establishments had fewer than 50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200
employees. In large organizations the primary respondent was the person in charge of
hiring, generally the personnel officer. If the primary respondent was unable to answer
..
questions about the training received by newly hired workers in the sampled job, that part
of the interview was completed by talking to a supervisor or someone else with line
responsibility.
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The employers who received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the last new
employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still
employed by your company." Only 2594 employers had hired someone in the time frame
requested and these employers constitute the sample used in the study.
The respondent was asked to report how much time typical new hires for this job
spent. during the first three months of employment in four different kinds of training
activities: (1) watching others do the job rather than doing it themselves, (2) formal training
programs, (3) informal individualized training and extra supervision by management and line
supervisors, and (4) informal individualized training and extra supervision by co-workers.
For the sample offirms and jobs, the means for the typical worker were 47.3 hours watching
others do the job (Tw), 10.7 hours for formal training programs (Tf), 51 hours for informal
training by management (Ts)' 24.2 hours for informal training by co-workers (Tc). A copy
of the relevant portions of the questionnaire is available from the author.
Training time indexes were constructed by placing relative values on trainer and
trainee time and then combining the time invested in training activities during the first three
months on the job. The management staff members who provide formal and informal
training were assumed to be paid 1.5 times the wage of coworkers with 2 years of tenure.
Formal training involves both the trainer and trainee's time. Sometimes it is one-on-one
and sometimes it is done in groups. It was assumed that the average ratio of trainees to
trainers was 4 and that the value of the trainer's time (including the amortized cost of
developing the training package) was four times the wage of a coworker with two years of
tenure. The time of trainees engaged in formal training was assumed to have a value of
8/lOths of a experienced coworker's time. When supervisors and coworkers are giving
informal training to a new employee, the trainee is almost invariably directly involved in a
production activity. Employers report that for inf6rmal training, the trainees are typically
as productive while being trained as they are when working alone (Hollenbeck and Smith
1984). Consequently, informal training is assumed to involve only the investment of the
trainer's time.
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Appendix B
Measures of the Profitability Differentials for New Hires
Estimates of differentials in the ex-post profitability of the two new hires by
combining the data on their wage, productivity and training costs differentials. Because data
is not available on costs of training beyond the first three months at the firm, the ex-post
profitability variable for the date of the interview or separation is based solely on a
comparison of the productivity and wage rate differentials between the two new hires. In
EOPP data the formula for profitability differential at the time of the interview was:
y\-yC2j = [(p\_p\)/pTj] - In(W\/Wc2) (Ia)
The formula for the differential in ex-post profitability during the first three months is:
y\-yS2j = [(P\-pS2j)/pTj] - [(T\-r2j)/520] - [(W\-W\)/WTj] (2a)
where
y\, yCjj = Profitability (excluding any tax credits) of the "i"th new hire in job "j"
during the first three months (S), during the first week (I W), at the end
of six months (6M) and at the time of the interview or separation (C).
pSij, pCjj = Productivity index for person "i" during the first 3 months (S), during the
. first week (IW), at the end of six months (6M) and at the time of the
interview or separation (C).
W\, WCjj = Wage of person "i" at the start (S) and at the time of the interview or
separation (C).
p2Y. W2Y.
J' J = Productivity index and wage of the typical worker in job "j" with twoyears of tenure (2Y).
rjj = Opportunity costs during the first three months of training person "i". The
units of the training index are hours of time of a worker with two years
of tenure in job "j".
Note that by dividing by p2\ the productivity differential, (P\-P\), is translated into the
metric of the productivity expected from a worker with two years of tenure in job "j". This
is also the metric of the training cost differential so the two terms may be summed. The
starting wage differential, (W\- W\), is divided by the wage of a typical worker with two
years of tenure in the job. The profitability proxy is constructed under an assumption that
p2Y.
= W2Y.. This implies that the third term need not be multiplied by an adjustmentJ J
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factor before being subtracted from the terms describing productivity and training
differentials.
In NFIB data the formulas for ex-post profitability differentials for the first week
(1W), the next six months (6M) and at the interview were:
ylWlf ylW2j = [(plWlrplW2)/p6Mj]- [(T1WlfT1W2j)/40]- [W\/WS2j] + 1 (3a)
y6Mlry6M2j = [(p6MlrP6M2j)/p6Mj] - [(T6MlrT6M2j)/960] - [W\/W\] + 1 (4a)
y\-yC2j = [In(p\/pC2j)] - [(T6MlrT6M2j)/960] - [In(W\/WC2j)] (Sa)
where:
T1Wjj
= Hours spent by person "i" in training during the first week.
T6Mjj
= Hours spent by person "i" in training during the next 6 months.
These NFIB formulas assume that p6Mj= WSj = W\ Because workers with formal off job
training from a previous employer are not paid more than other workers, other assumptions
regarding the relationship between p6Mj' WSj and WCj (such as p6Mj = 1.4Wc) will not
change the statistical significance of the tests of the hypothesis that coefficient B in equation
(1) is greater than zero. The tests of the profitability of hiring workers with relevant
experience are, however, sensitive to these assumptions.
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ENDNOTES
1. Our purpose does not necessitate estimating a structural model of the relationship
between background and job performance. Structural models of the relation
between background and performance in a sample of job applicants cannot be
estimated using these data without bias because of the truncated nature of the
sample (the applicants who were believed to have low productivity were not hired,
so observations on their job performance are not available) (Brown 1982). If
hiring selections were based entirely on worker characteristics included in the
model, unstandardized coefficients would provide unbiased estimates of the
structural relationship between these characteristics and job performance.
Unfortunately, however, incidental selection based on unobservables such as
interview performance and recommendations is very probable (Thorndike 1949;
Olson and Becker 1983; Mueser and Maloney 1987). In a selected sample like
accepted job applicants, one cannot argue that these omitted unobservable
variables are uncorrelated with the included variables that were used to make
initial hiring decisions and, therefore, that coefficients on included variables are
unbiased. When someone with 10 years of formal schooling is hired for a job that
normally requires 12 years of schooling, there is probably a reason for that
decision. The employer saw something positive in that job applicant (maybe the
applicant received a particularly strong recommendation from previous employers)
that led to the decision to make an exception to the rule that new hires should
have 12 years of schooling. Our data set does not include information on these
compensating factors which may have induced the firm to hire the individual, so
the coefficient on schooling is likely to be biased toward zero. This phenomenon
also causes the estimated effects of other worker traits used to select workers for
the job such as previous relevant work experience to be biased toward zero.
Worker characteristics which were not used to select new hires will have either
zero or positive correlations with the unobservable so their coefficients will
probably not be subject to a downward bias.
Unfortunately, respondents were not told what to do when they felt unable to
estimate the time devoted to training. The result was that it was often not clear
whether a blank response should be coded as a zero or as a don't know. The
following decision rules were adopted. Responses of "Continuous," "DK" and "?"
were coded as missing. If the employer had entered a "a" or "none" for one
category of training and left others categories blank, blanks were coded as
missing. If the employer had not answered the question about productivity at the
end of six months, all training questions about the six months period following the
first week were coded as missing. Otherwise, a blank was coded as zero. This
procedure probably errs on the side of retaining observations that should have
been dropped and this lowers calculated means for the sample. The resulting
means for the first week on the job were 18.4 hours for trainer time, 5.7 hours for
2.
3. Note that the effect of 5 years of relevant experience which is not offset by a
decline in irrelevant experience is obtained by adding the predicted effect of a
simultaneous increase in both relevant experience and total experience.
Alexander's (1974) analysis of longitudinal data on earnings from social security
files and Hollenbeck and Willke's analyses of 1983 CPS data in this report
obtained similar results. Holding the amount of experience at the firm constant,
past experience in one's current industry or occupation had larger positive effects
on earnings than experience in other industries or occupations.
4. The measure of profitability for the interview date was obtained by subtracting
proportionate differences in wage rates from proportionate differences in
productivity. Differences in the costs of training the worker were not measured
beyond the first 3-6 months, so this variable captures only part of the variations
across people in their current profitability to the firm. The positive effects of
relevant training and experience on profitability are probably understated as a
consequence.
